Hello,

The weekend comes, but I think it might be interesting: I've thought
about several factors which could determine the capability of a Strike
Fighter Squadron to perform high tempo operations, or a large number of
sorties for a short time. Maybe you know something that I do not know,
or have some other ideas? The following example is for a carrier-based
F/A-18E/F squadron, built on the rule "the more of something you have,
the more sorties you can generate"...

1) The number of aircraft per a squadron (now about 12 F/A-18E or 14
F/A-18F).

Some official sources say the number of aircraft per squadron would
decrease to 10, but I can see it concerns only future F-35B/C (JSF)
squadrons.

More aircraft give more flexibility (some of them may be permanently
configured as recce or tankers), and greater margin for possible
operational losses.

2) The number of aircrews (pilots, WSOs) in a squadron (16 pilots for a
12-plane F/A-18A/C squadron?).

3) The number of maintenance people for a squadron (244 men for an
F/A-18A squadron, IIRC).

4) Aircraft carrier flight deck/hangar deck issues:
- number of people for the "roof" and "hanger",
- number and availability of workshops/maintenance devices,
- issues connected with the flight deck itself and/or the air plan.

I've heard there was such an experiment made aboard USS Nimitz, when
additional people ferried to the carrier in the 5th Fleet AOR make it
possible to "wind-up" the tempo of air operations.

Also, I guess that a failed aircraft elevator or a broken cat can spoil
you the whole day...

5) Availability of aircraft "consumables" on board of a carrier, that
is:
- JP-5 fuel,
- lubricants,
- LOX,
and so on...

6) Availability of aircraft "expendables" aboard a carrier:
- various external ordnance and modification kits (in case of modular
weapons as JDAM or Paveway)

In the WWII on the Pacific the ship's ordnance stock could be tailored
for the mission - for example, there were less torpedos and more HVARs
close to the end of the war...

- gun ammo, chaff, flare,
- missile adapters, multiple bomb racks etc.
- weapon pylons (in "clean" configuration removed),
- external fuel tanks (I guess every squadron brings aboard their own
ones?),
- buddy refueling stores (4 per a squadron?),
- ATFLIR pods,

AFAIK F-14 squadrons used to have 6 LANTIRN pods each, I am not sure
how it can be with F/A-18s. I've just learnt the Navy is going to buy
about 574 ATFLIRs, so it looks like every deployed F/A-18A+/C/E/F
having its own navigation/targeting pod...

- SHARP pods,

Again, F-14 squadrons had 3 TARPS pods - so, also 3 SHARPs for an
F/A-18F squadron (F/A-18E can carry the pod also, but is not expected
to fulfill the recce mission).

- other pods, including ECM (this issue will appear when EA-18G with
their ALQ-228 and ALQ-99 comes into service.

What do you think about? How it is in other services?

Best regards,

Jacek Zemlo

I'm not sure where your rule "the more of something you have, the
more sorties you can generate...." came from but I guarantee that it is
not always true. The maximum number of airplanes a squadron can
effectively operate aboard ship depends upon more than the obvious.
Most important is the status of your supply system. How many "useful"
maintenance men do you have? If you have 240 men to work with how many
are workers and how many are PIAs that require more effort than they
produce. We called them "no-loads" and they were overall minuses. How
hard is the airplane to maintain? We used to call this MMH per Flight
hour. The old A-5 Vigilante took in excess of 200 maintenance man
hours per flight hour while the old A-4 took maybe 4 or 5. Early Navy
Phantom squadrons flew mostly without operating radars because they
were so hard to keep up. When the Navy went back to the CV concept,
airwings with on-board ASW planes and Helos all VA and VF squadrons
reduced airplanes from 12 to ten and total manpower by about ten
percent. Squadrons were allowed to get rid of any two airplanes they
wanted and any bad apple sailors they had up to ten percent. Surprise,
surprise, number of sorties increased as did overall availability.
Least important was number of pilots. Having fewer pilot allowed us to
concentrate more training into what we had. Result, improved
operational readiness. Doing more with less, violates your rule.

Supply system effectiveness was very important. When the supply system
couldn't keep up with demand, airplanes got cannabilized and we'd end
up with one or two hangar queens that looked like they'd been picked
clean by pirahnnas. When you cannabilized for parts to make up for a
poor supply sytem you doubled the effort required to change one part.
Guys will also start illegally rat holing parts they know they'll need,
further screwing up the supply system. Just saying no to cannabilizing
sounds good but in the real world guys just aren't going to let four
airplanes sit down in the hangar if one needs a wing light, another an
elased time clock, another an IFF box and maybe another an UHF radio.
Regardless of policy these gripes will be combined on one airplane and
get the others up and ready. Like pregnacy, just a little bit is all
it takes.

How many airplanes should you have for max availability? Every
squadron will have a different answer. Take any E-8 or 9 maintenance
Chief, give him a week with an embarked squadron and he could tell you
the answer. We usually size our squadrons by things like deck space,
mission requirements, number of bunks on board, and tradition. Where
did the magic number twelve come from? Been used so long I'll bet
nobody remembers. In the airplane business it's Quality not quantity
that really counts. And it's very difficult to quantify quality.





wrote:
> Hello,
>
> The weekend comes, but I think it might be interesting: I've thought
> about several factors which could determine the capability of a
Strike
> Fighter Squadron to perform high tempo operations, or a large number
of
> sorties for a short time. Maybe you know something that I do not
know,
> or have some other ideas? The following example is for a
carrier-based
> F/A-18E/F squadron, built on the rule "the more of something you
have,
> the more sorties you can generate"...
>
> 1) The number of aircraft per a squadron (now about 12 F/A-18E or 14
> F/A-18F).
>
> Some official sources say the number of aircraft per squadron would
> decrease to 10, but I can see it concerns only future F-35B/C (JSF)
> squadrons.
>
> More aircraft give more flexibility (some of them may be permanently
> configured as recce or tankers), and greater margin for possible
> operational losses.
>
> 2) The number of aircrews (pilots, WSOs) in a squadron (16 pilots for
a
> 12-plane F/A-18A/C squadron?).
>
> 3) The number of maintenance people for a squadron (244 men for an
> F/A-18A squadron, IIRC).
>
> 4) Aircraft carrier flight deck/hangar deck issues:
> - number of people for the "roof" and "hanger",
> - number and availability of workshops/maintenance devices,
> - issues connected with the flight deck itself and/or the air plan.
>
> I've heard there was such an experiment made aboard USS Nimitz, when
> additional people ferried to the carrier in the 5th Fleet AOR make it
> possible to "wind-up" the tempo of air operations.
>
> Also, I guess that a failed aircraft elevator or a broken cat can
spoil
> you the whole day...
>
> 5) Availability of aircraft "consumables" on board of a carrier,
that
> is:
> - JP-5 fuel,
> - lubricants,
> - LOX,
> and so on...
>
> 6) Availability of aircraft "expendables" aboard a carrier:
> - various external ordnance and modification kits (in case of modular
> weapons as JDAM or Paveway)
>
> In the WWII on the Pacific the ship's ordnance stock could be
tailored
> for the mission - for example, there were less torpedos and more
HVARs
> close to the end of the war...
>
> - gun ammo, chaff, flare,
> - missile adapters, multiple bomb racks etc.
> - weapon pylons (in "clean" configuration removed),
> - external fuel tanks (I guess every squadron brings aboard their own
> ones?),
> - buddy refueling stores (4 per a squadron?),
> - ATFLIR pods,
>
> AFAIK F-14 squadrons used to have 6 LANTIRN pods each, I am not sure
> how it can be with F/A-18s. I've just learnt the Navy is going to buy
> about 574 ATFLIRs, so it looks like every deployed F/A-18A+/C/E/F
> having its own navigation/targeting pod...
>
> - SHARP pods,
>
> Again, F-14 squadrons had 3 TARPS pods - so, also 3 SHARPs for an
> F/A-18F squadron (F/A-18E can carry the pod also, but is not expected
> to fulfill the recce mission).
>
> - other pods, including ECM (this issue will appear when EA-18G with
> their ALQ-228 and ALQ-99 comes into service.
>
> What do you think about? How it is in other services?
>
> Best regards,
>
> Jacek Zemlo

Thank you, Bob, for emphasising some aspects.

Serviceability, MMH/FH? Yeah, isn't that one of the main benefits
(critics would add: not many) of switching to all-Hornet air wings?

Personally, I have always believed the number of 12 aircraft per
squadron was used, because it was very easy to divide into pairs,
flights of 3 or 4, and also easily divided by six (for example, when 3
pairs of Tomcats were required for a CAP at the time).

Now sources vary on this subject:
some say: 12 a/c for F/A-18 sqn and 10 a/c for F-35/JSF sqn,
other say: 10 a/c for CV-based squadrons, 12 a/c for land-based,
or: more than 10 F/A-18s per a squadron, but only when they provide the
air wing with tankers...

Best regards,

Jacek

Hi Jacek,
The question might be will switching to an all-Hornet airwing actually
result in a lower MMH/FH number for the involed squadrons? Bean
counters and analysts would probably agree that benefits of scale, less
duplicity, and better support concentration should result in a lower
MMH/FH. I doubt it. On the other hand, having four or five squadrons
with the same airplane might very well net you better availability just
from the improved competitive environment. Guys would try harder to be
number one in all quantifiable aspects of their efforts. There would
be a distinct tendenency for your supply system to anticipate lower
inventory need and give you fewer high failure parts per embarked
airplane. Reshuffling a carrier's supply inventory takes a major
effort so it would be unlikely all the non-Hornet parts would be off
loaded. Carriers spare parts lockers are space limited. Most often
the most used parts are in short supply with the least called for being
the majority. No matter how you provision expected MTBF's will not
equal actual usage. Peter principle. The longer your AOCP times
become, the lower your availability and higher the MMH/FH. Long AOCP
times result in squadron ratholing and resulting lower supply parts
availabilty. Any guy who would be smart enough to solve this should be
transferred to working on world peace.

Actually, we are talking about not one type, but two - because we can
say about a great degree of commonality between F/A-18A+ and C, or
between F/A-18E, F/A-18F and (future) EA-18G. That is why every "older"
CV (I mean: except CVN-75 and CVN-76) which is gonna to deploy with
F/A-18E or F (or both), has to undergo some modifications first.

CVW-9 in 2003 - with four F/A-18C squadrons (VFA-22, VFA-146, VFA-147,
plus VMFA-314) - yes, that was commonality indeed, but capabilities
(combat radius, on-station time, cycles lenght etc) must have suffered.

Surely, putting Rhinos on carriers should be a progress when compared
to MMH-eating F-14 and A-6s. But there will be a time some day when now
brand-new F/A-18E/Fs also get older, and IF consider them "stealth"
aircraft, they may require more maintenance to be kept as radar-clean
as possible after being exposed to AAA/SAM fire and/or harsh weather
conditions?...

Regards,

Jacek